Public health expenditure, social security, and fertility by 大森 達也
－1－
総合政策論叢　
第 6 号
2 0 1 5 年 3 月
Public health expenditure, social security,  
and fertility
Tatsuya OMORI
（大　森　達　也）
1. Introduction
As an economy grows, its pattern of demographic transition changes, becoming increas-
ingly characterized by low mortality and low fertility. Such longer life span affects not only 
private saving behavior, but also child-bearing behavior. Children enhance parents’ utility 
and generate increased costs, such that greater longevity causes the agent to save more for 
life after retirement. This condition gives a disincentive to having children because of child 
care costs.
  One factor prolonging life, among others, is public health expenditure.1 Public health 
expenditures extend longevity and affect the social security system, which secures the life 
risk upon retirement. Public health contributes to the increase in the number of elderly 
people who face life risk, which is why the government pays more social security benefits 
to elderly people. To resolve related issues, a government that incorporates public health 
expenditure and social security adopts public policy to enhance fertility and to increase the 
total population.2
 1 As demonstrated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2010), 
the ratio of public health expenditure to total health expenditure of the US increased from 44.9 percent 
in 1995 to 46.5 percent in 2008. That of Italy also increased from 70.8 percent in 1995 to 77.2 percent 
in 2008. In OECD countries, the ratio of public health expenditure is expected to continue to increase, 
thus serving a critical function in national health.
 2 Empirical studies on the effects of social security on private saving and the fertility decision have 
been presented by Cigno and Rosati (1992), Cigno and Rosati (1996), Cigno and Rosati (1997), Ehrlich 
and Zhong (1998), Cigno, Casolaro and Rosati (2003), Zhang and Zhang (2004), and others.
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  According to a study by Becker and Barro (1988), social security might affect private 
saving and the demand for children.2 Introducing parents’ child-care costs into the model, 
Zhang and Zhang (1998) show that a higher social security tax rate tends to be detrimental 
to economic growth and welfare. Incorporating an uncertain lifetime into Zhang and Zhang 
(1998), Yakita (2001) shows that an increasing life expectancy lowers fertility and that 
pay-as-you-go social security does not reverse fertility.3 However, some room exists for us 
to examine the effects of public health expenditure on fertility and welfare because public 
health expenditures are not included in these models.
  As regards discussion on public health care and social security, Chakraborty (2004) 
examines how extending longevity by augmenting public health expenditure is conducive 
to growth and shows that high-mortality societies do not grow rapidly because a shorter 
lifespan discourages savings. Zhang, Zhang, and Leung (2006) study the effects of social se-
curity and health subsidies on private savings, private health investment, and welfare in the 
overlapping-generations model. Pestieau, Ponthiere, and Sato (2008) show that the sign of 
an optimal subsidy on health expenditures tends to be negative when the replacement ratio 
is sufficiently large. In these discussions, the effects of public health expenditure to extend 
longevity on fertility are excluded. We can examine the connections among public health 
expenditure, social security, and fertility using an overlapping-generations model.
  As described in this paper, introducing public health expenditure and longevity into 
the overlapping-generations model with social security, we examine the effects of public 
health expenditure and social security benefits on fertility and welfare.4
  To clarify how public health expenditure and social security benefits affect fertility 
decisions and welfare, we examine the effects of different types of income taxes on fertility 
and welfare. When the government budget constraint is decoupled and dedicated taxes 
are levied on both public health expenditure and social security benefits, we can consider 
the effect of health tax (tax for public health expenditure) on fertility and welfare while 
 3 Omori (2009) analyzes social security and public education in a model with endogenous 
fertility.
 4 Andersen (2005), Bovenberg and Uhlig (2006), Andersen(2008), and others discuss the relation-
ship between life risk and social security. Expanding longevity through public health expenditure 
causes consumers to face life risk more, causing them to need savings and social security to minimize 
such risk. In other words, based on the literature, this paper discusses the relationship between life risk, 
which public health expenditure affects, and social security.
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maintaining the social security tax (tax for social security benefits) constant and that of 
social security tax with a constant health tax. These different financing mechanisms might 
present different implications for fertility and welfare and might clarify how parents’ deci-
sions on children depend on public health expenditure and/or social security benefits. 
  The question addressed in this paper is the following: When a government budget con-
straint is decoupled and dedicated taxes are levied on both for public health expenditure 
and for social security, how can such taxes affect fertility and welfare?
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. 
 Section 3 presents optimal plans for the consumer in equilibrium. Based on Section 3, Sec-
tion 4 clarifies the effects of a health tax and a social security tax on fertility and welfare. 
The last section presents concluding remarks.
2. Model
As developed by Diamond (1965), we consider an overlapping-generations model of a small
open economy.5 For simplicity, we assume that the world interest rate remains constant 
over time. The capital labor ratio and wage rate are also constant. The economy comprises 
identical three-period-lived agents, perfectly competitive firms, and a government. The 
production technology is assumed to be governed by a standard neoclassical constant-
returns-to-scale production function.
2.1 Consumers
Agents in the first period of their lives, the young generation, are raised by their parents. 
Agents in the second period of their lives, the working generation, supply their labor to 
firms inelastically.6 These agents divide their after-tax income among current consumption, 
savings for consumption when old, and child-raising expenditures. 
  With probability pt, an agent who worked during period t will live throughout old age, 
and with probability 1 – pt, the agent will die before the onset of the third period, old age. 
 5 To keep the analysis simple, we develop the overlapping-generations model in a small open economy. 
We can also develop a similar model in a closed economy. The path in a closed economy might not be 
fundamentally different from that in a small open economy.
 6 In Appendix A, when we introduce the labor-leisure choice into the model, we show the dynamic 
system.
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In this model, similar to that presented by Chakraborty (2004) and Pestieau et al. (2008), 
when introducing longevity into the overlapping-generations model, we assume that the 
probability of survival, pt, is the same for all individuals. 
  Agents in the final period of their lives, the older generation, consume social security 
benefits and accumulated savings. Accidental bequests emerge if an agent dies at the onset 
of old age. However, introducing an annuity market into the model, we do not presume 
accidental bequests. The return in the annuity market at period t is the interest rate, 1 + r, 
divided by .
  The working generation at period t is called generation t, such that the preference of a 
representative agent of generation t is
(1)
where cw
t  and co
t  respectively denote the consumption of generation t during the working 
generation period and the old period, nt+1 is the number of children, and l
t is the leisure for 
generation t. Let Nt be the total working generation population at period t. Therefore, we 
have Nt+1 = (1 + nt+1)Nt.7
  The budget constraints of a representative agent of generation t in the working and old 
periods are given respectively as
(2)
and
(3)
where st signifies savings,  represents the parents’ child cost per child, H stands for the 
wage income tax rate for public health expenditure, s is the wage income tax rate for social 
security benefits, w is the wage rate, and Tt+1 is the social security benefits at t + 1.
  Given the wage rate, interest rate, wage income tax rates, probability of surviving, and 
the child-care cost per child, a representative agent chooses cw
t , co
t , and nt+1 to maximize 
utility, (1), subject to the budget constraints, (2) and (3). The first-order conditions are 
 7 Similar to Omori (2009), to show the population growth explicitly, we define this variable as 
Nt+1 = (1 + nt+1)Nt. However, even when we define population growth as Nt+1 = nt+1Nt, we can derive 
similar implications.
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the followings:
(4)
(5)
(6)
and
(7)
Therein,  is a Lagrangian multiplier.
  Based on the first-order conditions, the optimal plans for cw
t , co
t , and nt+1 are respectively
(8)
(9)
and
(10)
Substituting (9) into (3), the saving function, st, is
(11)
2.2 Government
The government is assumed to behave under a balanced budget regime. Tax revenues are col-
lected to finance public health expenditure and social security benefits in the current period.
  We presume that the agents enjoy public health expenditures through extended lon-
gevity.8 Public health expenditure extends longevity if new medications for the treatment 
of diabetes and high blood-pressure are developed and if the working generations take 
these medications. Herein, we discuss the effects of public health expenditure on fertility. 
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For simplicity, we assume away the private medical research sector and any spillover effect 
of health expenditure. Similar to Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007), Osang and Sarkar (2008), 
Pestieau et al. (2008), Leung and Wang (2010), and others, we also assume that the prob-
ability of living into the old period is a function of public health expenditure, Gpt. That is,
(12)
For analytical simplicity, following Osang and Sarkar (2008) and Leung and Wang (2010),
we assume the following conditions: 0 < p < 1, p'  > 0, p(0) = p¯ (p¯ is constant), 0 < p¯ < 1, and 
 = 0. 
  We suppose that the government budget constraint is decoupled and that dedicated 
taxes exist both for public health expenditure and social security benefits. We can consider 
the effect of a tax for public health expenditure (health tax) on fertility while maintaining a 
constant social security tax and that of social security tax with a constant health tax.9 This 
discussion clarifies how parents’ decisions to bear and care for children depend on public 
health expenditure and/or social security benefits.
  The government budget constraints for the working generation at period t are given as
(13)
and 
(14)
  For the following discussion, the government is assumed to predetermine the sequenc-
es of H and s for simplicity. We also note that p(G
p
t ) = p( Hw).
 8 Although private health expenditure also has a direct effect on longevity, we do not discuss the 
spillover effects of public policy on private health care in this paper. Cigno and Pinal (2004) present 
evidence that public health expenditure crowds in private health expenditure in Argentina. However, 
the purpose of this paper is to discuss the effects of public health expenditure on fertility. The introduc-
tion of spillover effects of public health expenditure on private health expenditure makes it difficult for 
us to discuss how public health expenditure affects longevity and fertility. Thus, we assume the lack of 
private health expenditures in this paper.
 9 In economically developed countries, such as Japan, governments adopt an earmarked tax policy to 
finance public health insurance (expenditure) and social security benefits. Omori (2009) examines the 
respective effects of earmarked tax for social security and public education on fertility.
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3. Optimal plans
In equilibrium, based on (10), (13), and (14), the optimal plan for the number of children, 
n*, is as follows: 
(15)
This economy is regarded as a small open economy where the capital labor ratio, interest 
rate, and wage rate are constant. H and s are also assumed to be predetermined and fixed 
over time. Thus, public health expenditure, G
p
t , is fixed over time because of the govern-
ment budget constraint of (13). Therefore, n* is the time-invariant variable in equilibrium.10 
Moreover, because children are normal goods in this model, n* must be positive. The de-
nominator on the right-hand-side of (15) is assumed to be positive. We assume 
(16)
Hereinafter, we discuss the policy effects on fertility by the evaluation of increments 
under the assumption that (16) holds. The variables in equilibrium are denoted with su-
perscript *.
  Similarly, rewriting (8), (9), and (11), the optimal plans for cw* , co*, and s* in equilibrium 
are shown by 
(17)
(18)
and
(19)
  n* is the time-invariant variable in equilibrium from (15), such that cw* , co*, and s* are 
also the time-invariant variables in equilibrium. We suppose that these variables are posi-
 10 In Appendix A, we show the dynamical system when we introduce the labor-leisure choice into the 
model. That system is too complex to discuss the policy effects. For simplicity, we assume the lack of 
such choice but the path may not be essentially different from the one excluding such choice.
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tive with the assumption that (1 + r) (1 – H) – (r – n*) s > 0 and p( Hw) (1 + r) (1 – H – s) 
– (1 + ) (1 + n*) s > 0.
4. Health tax and social security tax
4.1 Health tax
4.1.1 Fertility
In this subsection, while holding the social security tax constant, we examine the effects of 
health tax on fertility. We differentiate (15) with respect to H. That is,
(20)
When the wage income tax rate for social security is constant, a higher health tax rate 
decreases fertility.
  By contrast, from (19), the effects of health tax rate on saving is shown by
(21)
In the numerator in (21), if [(1 – H – s) – s*] w –   > p,  is positive, and 
vice versa.
  Therefore, these findings lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When the wage income tax rate for social security is constant, a 
higher health tax rate decreases fertility. Moreover, if
(22)
such tax rate increases savings.
  A higher tax rate decreases disposable income and fertility. An increasing health tax 
rate extends longevity and reduces the return in the annuity market. When the indirect 
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effects of health tax on social security payments [the left-hand-side of (22)] is more than 
the direct effects on survival rate [the right-hand-side of (22)], such tax increases savings. 
Cutting the rising cost for children, they might save more to compensate for their decreas-
ing lifetime income. Consumers do have an incentive to bear fewer children and need more 
savings for consumption in the old period.
  However, when [(1 – H – s) – s*] w –   < p, such tax decreases not only 
fertility but also savings because the tax effects on saving are too strong. 
  Similarly, from (17) and (18), the effects on consumptions are negative, as
(23)
and
(24)
We note that (1 + r) (1 – H) – (r – n*) s > 0 is assumed. The effects on consumption are
negative because increasing tax decreases disposable income.
4.1.2 Welfare
We examine the effects of health tax on welfare. We define the indirect utility function of 
generation t in equilibrium as 
(25)
Although we have numerous welfare functions in the literature, as we suppose the small 
open economy and the variables in equilibrium are constant in this paper, we define the 
welfare function as (25). We derive the derivative of (25) with respect to H as
(26)
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  From Proposition 1,  is negative. Based on (23) and (24), the welfare effects of a 
health tax are shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2
If
(27)
Consequently, a higher health tax rate increases welfare, and vice versa.
  A higher health tax rate extends longevity, and agents enjoy consumption in the old 
period, as shown on the left-hand side of (27). Such conditions are called positive welfare 
effects. However, as previously discussed, such a tax rate decreases fertility and consump-
tion. Lower fertility decreases social security benefits. Increasing the health tax rate gener-
ates negative welfare effects, where agents do not enjoy consumption and having children, 
as shown on the right-hand side of (27). Therefore, when the former effect is greater than 
the latter effect, a higher health tax rate increases welfare, and vice versa. We can show that 
we enjoy enhanced welfare even in an economy with declining fertility.
4.2 Social security tax
4.2.1 Fertility
We discuss the effects of a social security tax on fertility while holding the health tax
constant.
  We derive the derivative of (15) with respect to s as
(28)
In particular, considering the numerator on the right-hand-side of (28), if
(29)
 < 0, and vice versa.
  From (19), we show the effect of social security tax on saving as
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(30)
From the numerator on the right-hand side of (30), when r > n*, if (1 + )(1 + n*) + 
(1 + ) s  < – (1 + r)p( Hw),  is positive. Therefore, we can show the following 
proposition:
Proposition 3 When the wage income tax rate for public health expenditure is con-
stant, if r > n*, a higher social security tax rate decreases fertility. Moreover, if r is 
more than n* and 
(31)
then such tax increases savings.
  A higher social security tax rate increases social security benefits. Such effect on ben-
efits is reflected in n*. In this model, we presume an unfunded social security system. When 
the private interest rate in the annuity market is more than that in tax effects, a higher 
social security tax decreases the income for the old generation. Consequently, extended 
longevity decreases social security benefits, such that the working generation requires 
more savings for consumption during the old age as shown in the left-hand side of (31). 
However, because rearing children entails cost, consumers have an incentive to decrease 
the number of children they want to have, which affects the social security benefits on 
the right-hand side of (31). If the former effects are stronger than the latter, the effects of 
social security tax on lifetime income will cause agents to save more.11
  By contrast, when r is less than n*, a higher social security tax rate increases fertility 
and decreases savings.12 In this case, because a higher social security tax rate increases the 
lifetime income, consumers can compensate for the child-raising cost with cutting their 
savings.
 11 If the former effects are less than the latter, such tax decreases savings because of the strong tax 
effects.
 12 As  > 0 and (1 + r)p( Hw) + (1 + )(1 + n*) + (1 + ) s  > 0 is negative.
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  Finally, based on Proposition 3, when r is more than n*, the tax effects on consump-
tion are negative, as
(32)
and
(33)
We note that, when r < n*,  and  are positive.
4.2.2 Welfare
Finally, we examine the welfare effects. We derive the derivative of (25) with respect to s 
as
(34)
  As Proposition 3 shows,  is negative when r > n*. From (32) and (33), if r > n*,  
and  are also negative. We present the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If r > n*, then a higher social security tax rate decreases welfare.
  As explained in Proposition 3, when r is more than n*, a higher social security tax rate 
increases social security benefits but decreases fertility. The tax effects cause the agents 
to consume less. Therefore, if r > n*, a higher social security tax rate decreases welfare.
  Finally, if r < n*, as ,  and  are positive, a higher social security tax rate en-
hances welfare because of the positive effects of tax on lifetime income.
5. Concluding remarks
As described in this paper, introducing public health expenditure and longevity into an 
overlapping-generations model, we studied how public health expenditure and social secu-
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rity affect fertility and welfare.
  We presented two results. First, when the wage income tax rate for social security is 
constant, a higher tax rate for public health expenditure decreases fertility, but can en-
hance welfare. Second, at a constant wage income tax rate for public health expenditure, 
if the interest rate is more than the fertility rate, a higher tax rate for social security can 
decrease fertility and welfare.
  Expanding longevity affects parents’ saving behavior for their retirement. However, an 
additional child causes parents to affect their savings to cover the cost of having children. 
Social security benefits partly compensate for the savings cut and give parents an incentive 
to have more children. Public health expenditure, however, gives parents the incentive to 
bear fewer children. Therefore, public health expenditure extends longevity but decreases 
fertility. In an aging society, as public health policy accelerates the decline in fertility, we 
need to consider other public policies with social security to recover from the economy 
where fertility is declining.
Appendix A
When we introduce the labor-leisure choice into the model, our model is developed as fol-
lows: For the representative consumers of generation t, the utility function is 
(35)
where lt is the leisure for generation t. The budget constraints of a representative agent of 
generation t in the working and old periods are given respectively as
(36)
and
(37)
  The government budget constraints for the working generation at period t are given as
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(38)
and
(39)
  In equilibrium, the optimal plan for the number of children, nt+1, is as follows: 
(40)
Then, that for the leisure, lt, is given by 
(41)
These equations show the dynamical system in this model. However, when we do not con-
sider the labor-leisure choice (lt = 0 and  = 0), nt+1 on (40) is equal to n* on (15). If we 
include the labor-leisure choice in this paper, the model is too complex to examine the 
effects of public policies on fertility and welfare. As the purpose of this paper is to discuss 
how public health and social security affect the fertility and welfare, for simplicity, we do 
not consider the labor-leisure choice, although the path may not be essentially different 
from the one excluding such labor-leisure choice. 
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